This paper develops a theoretical model of mergers and applies it to the largest vehicle manufacturing firms in Iran, namely: Iran Khodrou and Saipa. The paper concentrates on the joint profit maximization and multidivisional firm approach. We estimate the relevant demand and cost functions based on a panel data procedure. Our empirical results indicate that if the insider firms cooperate in the post-merger situation and maximize their joint profit, the profitability of the merger to the insiders and outsiders will depend on reaction of the insiders to the production of one another; the merger would be socially unprofitable. When the insiders' reaction is modeled, insiders profit from the merger, but outsiders loose and vise versa. If the insiders form a two divisional firm after the merger and the production decisions at each division is delegated to the manager of that same division, then the merger is profitable socially, but costly from the standpoint of the outsiders. There is no evidence of private profitability in this kind of mergers.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950,s scholars in the field of industrial economics have been engaged in systematic research on profitability of mergers. Following is a short list of questions usually asked.
(a) Are mergers profitable to the participating firms (the insiders)?
(b) Are mergers profitable to the non-participating firms (the outsiders)?
(c) How do mergers affect consumer's welfare? Stigler (1950: 23-34) argues that in an integration the non-participating firms (the outsiders) may profit more than the participating firms (the insiders). The author, credited extensively for his handling of the free-rider problem in connection with mergers, argues that the production of the merging firm falls short of the total production of the participating firms before they merge. The industry's price goes up and firms not participating in the merger add to their production and benefit from the increased industry price. Stigler further concludes that mergers that increase the industry's profits are not necessarily profitable for the participants. Salant et al (1983:185-199) show that in a model with homogeneous goods, Cournot competition, linear demand and exogenously given and equal marginal costs, mergers typically are not profitable to the participants, unless the merger involved a large number of firms in the industry, but the outsiders benefit from the merger. Following the publication of Salant et al work, various scholars have tried to show that mergers could be profitable to participants in the merger and the incentive to integrate horizontally is strong. Perry and Porter (1985:219-227) , maintain that integrated firms are different from their individual constituent firms. Looking at integrated firms in this way makes a difference to the results obtained from horizontal integration. Using a model with the capital share variable they show that horizontal integration among a number of firms in an industry results in a firm that, because of having a higher capital share, is larger than the individual constituent firm.
Denecker and Davidson (1985:473-486 ) used a model where a merged unit is larger than any the original firms, in the sense that the participants keep all their brands after the merger. Assuming product differentiation and Bertrand competition, they found that mergers without marginal cost savings tend to be profitable. Even in this setting, though, it is better to free-ride on the merger than to participate. Salant and Gaudet (1991:658-665) show that number of firms constituting the merger (the number of the insiders) and the so-called adjustment factor are among the variables that affect the profitability to the insiders of a merger. The characteristics of demand and costs (the slope of the inverse demand function, the slope of the cost function, the second derivative of the cost function and the second derivative of the demand function) are the factors constituting the adjustment factor.
Bru and Faulli-Oller (1991:1-7) show that integration among a number of industry participants increases the purchasing power of the firms and this can compensate for the effect of the outsider's response. Therefore, they conclude, integration can be profitable for firms participating in the integration. Lommerud et al(2005:717-743) show that after integration the integrated firm would gain purchasing power in the input market so that it can obtain inputs at reduced prices. Hence, mergers can be profitable to the participants. Eckbo (1983:241-273)) and Fee and Thomas (2004:423-460 ) have tried to explain profitability of integration descriptively. They try to explain efficiency and collusion effects resulting from participants in the integration.
The common approach is all these papers is adhering the notion of joint profit maximization (JPM). That is, every merger like any other firm seeks to maximize its profit. Since the profit of the merger is the total profit of its constituent firms, the objective of the merger is joint profit maximization.
Crean and Davidson (2004:951-977) view the merger as like a multidivisional firm. A merger has divisions equal in numbers to the number of firms participating in the merger. The authors divide divisions of a merger into group I and group II. Group I is the leader and groups II is the follower. Staggered competition arises inside the merger or multidivisional firm and divisions of this firm and production levels are determined within a leaderfollower model framework However, these and the other papers reviewed above represent theoretical abstractions of horizontal mergers, while empirical prediction of the effect of mergers still remains scant. This paper notes that the approaches taken in literature on horizontal integration may be divided into the joint profit maximization approach (JPMA) consisting of the traditional technique (TT) and the merger simulation technique (MST) and the multidivisional firm approach (MDFA). Then it applies these approaches to study the effect of integration using two of the largest vehicle manufacturers in Iran, namely, Iran Khodrou and Saipa
The JPMA used in this paper is the approach that prevails in the literature. In the JPMA, we consider the so called traditional technique (TT) and the merger simulation technique (MST). However, we add a novelty to the TT by introducing the collusion parameter and argue that mergers can be beneficial to the insiders and that the incentive to merge horizontally is strong. Scholars after Salant each have tried to demonstrate this result by modeling social variables; we demonstrate it by modeling the collusion parameter. The cost and demand functions employed in this paper are estimated by pooling cross section and time series data over the time span of 1997-2006.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model of price and expected profit determination in both the JPMA and MDFA are introduced in section 2 that follows this introductory section (1). In section 3, estimates obtained for the demand and cost function are presented. Then in Section 4, merger effects using the JPMA and MDFA are discussed. Finally, section 5 summaries and brings the paper to its conclusions.
THE CONCEPTUAL PRESENTATION

The joint profit maximization approach
The joint profit maximization approach consists of the traditional technique and the merger simulation technique. We begin with the traditional technique.
The traditional technique
We consider the Iranian vehicle manufacturing Khodrou, Saipa, Pars Khodrou, Zambiad, Bahaman, Iran Khodrou Diesel and Saipa Dieselproducing heterogeneous products facing the following Inverse demand: The parameter issued to represent product differentiation as introduced by Chamberlin. It is assumed that each of these seven firms own a share i of industry's capital. The cost function for each firm with a capital share of i is: 
The assumption about MC (of i ) only is used in the case the JPMA. In the other approaches to complexities involved a constant marginal cost is assumed
The pre-merger game
In the pre-merger game, the firms of the industry decide their optimum production by: 
where is the parameter representing the degree of collusion. Meanwhile, the equilibrium condition of the outsiders does not change.
The merger simulation technique
Merger simulation is relatively new in the history of merger analysis. It is a set of quantitative techniques for predicting the price effects of mergers with differentiated products. Merger simulation takes as a starting point a model of equilibrium pricing (typically Bertrand), calibrates that model to the available industry data (for example, prices and shares), and uses the model to predict post-merger price changes. Merger simulation analysis is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, an estimation of a demand model provides own and cross-price elasticities of demand for the good in the pre-merger market. In the second stage, one solves the first-order conditions (FOCs) for post-transaction profit maximization by the new, post-merger entity. The post-transaction FOCs differ because they take account of both the cross-price elasticities between the two merging firms and the mergerspecific efficiencies. Three different demand forms are available for use in simulations: the antitrust logit model (ALM), the almost ideal demand systems (AIDS) and the proportionality-calibrated AIDS (PCAIDS). These models differ in their data requirements, difficulty of calibration, flexibility in representing price elasticities, and bottom-line predictions of price changes.
Simulation: the first stage
In the pre-merger game, firms determine their optimum production by the profit maximization rule. Therefore, to calculate the profit margin of the firms in the pre-merger stage we derive the first order conditions:
where n i is the profit margin of the ith firm prior to merging and n ii represents own price elasticity of the ith firm brand. Therefore, we need own price elasticities of firm brands in order to calculate the profit margin before merging. To arrive at the own price elasticities of brands, we can use the PCAIDS demand model as: 
The multidivisional firms approach
In the previous two cases, we used the traditional technique within the JPMA and the merger simulation technique in order to predict the effect of the merger on prices and profits. The TT in profit maximization is used extensively in the literature and is specifically known as the traditional (joint profit maximization) technique.
In this section, we view the merger as a multidivisional firm that divides the insider firms into the leader and follower category such that each seek to maximize their profit independently. So when Irankhodrou and Saipa merge and form a towdivisional firm based on the assumption that the former is the leader and the latter is the follower, we apply the profit maximization rule once to Saipa and once to Irankhdrou. Other manufactures are considered as outsiders and still in Cournot competition with each other. Furthermore, the outsider firms view the merging firms as Cournot competitors. We take marginal costs as constant and normalize them to zero without loss of generality. We devise a pre-merger and a postmerger game framework.
The pre-merger game
Consider the Iranian vehicle manufacturing industry with seven firms producing differentiated products and engage in a Cournot competition . The demand curve of these firms may be represented by: 
The post-merger game
Suppose that two out of the seven firms in the industry merge to form a two-divisional firm. This will leave five outsider firms that pursue to maximize their profits and hence determine their optimum production, prices and profit just like any other firm. To determine the production of the follower firm (Saipa in our case), we follow the profit maximization routine for this firm as: q is the production of the follower( Saipa in our case). Given a, b, and , we can obtain the price, production and profit of these firms in the post-merger stage.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
We have seven vehicle manufacturing firms in Iran that are represented in the Tehran stock exchange market. These are Irankhodrou, Saipa, Pars Khodrou, Zambiad, Bahman, Irankhodrou Diesel and Saipa Diesel. The data used in this paper is provided by the organization of stock exchange and covers the 1998-2007 period. We used the pulled cross section time series approach in order to estimate the parameters. Our estimates were engineered through EVIEWS 4 and Maple packages. The Chamberlin demand for vehicles is estimated in a semi-linear form by the pooling method as: The equation used to estimate the cost functions is based on the paper published by Perry and Porter (1985) . The merit of this equation is that it models each firm' total cost as a function of its output and capital share. The capital share plays an important role in the design of the post-merger game. The cost function is assumed semi-linear in logarithm (equation 40) and its estimate is based on the pooling method. is the average profit rate of the industry. We estimated the price and profit using the traditional technique and the semi-logarithmic linear functional form of demand and cost functions. In order to conclude the change in variables, we consider quantities pertinent to Irankhodrou as representative of an insider and quantities pertaining to Pars Khdrou as a representative of an outsider firm ( Table 2) .We can use simulation to predict the price effects of a merger activity. In other words, we can appraise the merging activity (merge or not merge) without having access to post-merger information. We make the simplifying assumption that the price elasticity of the industry demand is If we take the efficiency effect of Irankhodoru and Saipa merger into account we can obtain a new matrix of . In order to take account of the efficiency effect of the merger, we use the change in the capital share; actually in mergers the efficiency of insider firms rises due to the increase in their capital share (reduction in costs). Since outsider firm have not participated in the merger, the efficiency effect in these firms is assumed zero. At the end we calculate the percentage change in price and profits of the insiders and outsiders resulting from the merger of Irankhodrou and Saipa (table 5). 
SUMMERY AND CONCLUSION.
Our objective in this paper was to study the effect of mergers on production, price, and profitability of both the insider firms and the outsider firms. The literature proposes two approaches to implement such a study: the JPMA with the associated TT and MST and also the MDFA. While each approach has its own specific application type, any analysis undertaken also may be sensitive the approach taken. Aside from reviewing the arguments offered in each case in the relevant literature, we summarized the theoretical underpinnings of each approach and set apart our own theoretical construct from other theoretical constructs available in the literature.
We, then, applied our theoretical model to the vehicle manufacturing industry in Iran that includes seven firms with Irankhodrou and Saipa as the most prominent ones by virtue of their large size. These two were studied in their role as the leader and the follower firm.
We can now conclude the following regarding the merger: if the merger follows a maximization rule in determining its production, price and profits, then it would not benefit the consumer (or reduce consumer welfare). The profitability of the activity to the insider and outsider firms depends on modeling the reaction of the insiders to each others' production changes. The insiders increase their production while benefiting from the merger. But the outsiders reduce their production while not benefiting from the merger. Conversely, if the reaction of the insiders to the production of one another is not modeled, the insiders reduce their production while not benefiting from the merger. But, the outsiders increase their production while benefiting from the merger.
Our simulation results showed that there is no incidence of a substantial price effect of the merger. In other words, in the simulation technique, the welfare of customers is unaffected by the merger.
If the tow manufactures: Irankhodrou and Saipa form a two divisional firm after merging and production decisions in each division is delegated to the manager of that same division, in a case with Irankhdrou as the leader and Saipa as the follower in the framework of a Stakelberg model, the outcome would be costly to the outsiders but beneficial to the welfare of the consumers. There is no indication that the merger is profitable privately.
Subsequent to the Salant et al (1983) a variety of model constructions have been used to show that horizontal mergers are profitable to the insiders. Perry and Porter(1985) in a model with capital share, Deneckere and Davidson(1985) in a model with heterogeneous products , Lommerud et al(2005) in a model where reduced input prices and Bru and Faulli-Oller(2008) in a model with reduced purchasing power of the insiders in the post-merger game, all these have shown that horizontal mergers are profitable to the insiders. In this paper, we add the additional dimension about the reaction of the insiders to the production of one another and conclude similar results for the case of Irankhodrou and Saipa vehicle manufactures in Iran so that both benefit from joining in a merger.
The paper yields two important practical implications: First, the merger of Irankhodrou and Saipa while modeling the reaction of the insiders to the production of one another and adopting a semi-log linear demand function is profitable to the participants in the merger. Second, the insider and outsider prices change in the same direction. With an increase in the insider price, the outsider price also increases and with a decrease in the inside price the outsider price also decreases. In the analysis of game cases with heterogeneous products, competitors will raise their prices in response to post-merger higher prices of the merging firms and that this response is optimal.
